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Abstract
Based on a combinatorial distribution of shares we present in this paper secret sharing
schemes and cryptosystems using Nielsen transformations.
2010 Mathematics Subject Classification: 20E36, 20E05, 94A60, 94A62 .
Key words: Nielsen transformation, matrix group SL(2,Q), secret sharing protocol, private key
cryptosystem, public key cryptosystem.
1 Introduction
We first describe secret sharing protocols and combinatorial distributions of shares. After this
introductory definitions we start with a secret sharing scheme using directly the combinatorial
distribution of shares. Based on this we present two schemes in which we apply regular Nielsen
transformations in connections with faithful representations of free groups and the Nielsen re-
duction theory. In the last sections we modify the secret sharing schemes to a private key
cryptosystem and finally Nielsen transformations are used for a public key cryptosystem which
is inspired by the ElGamal cryptosystem. The new cryptographic protocols are in part in the
dissertation from A. Moldenhauer [6] under her supervisor G. Rosenberger at the University of
Hamburg.
A (n, t)-secret sharing protocol, with n, t ∈ N and t ≤ n, is a method to distribute a secret
among a group of n participants in such a way that it can be recovered only if at least t of them
combine their shares. Hence any group of t−1 or fewer participants cannot calculate the secret.
The number t is called threshold. The person who distributes the shares is called the dealer.
D. Panagopoulos presents in his paper [8] a (n, t)-secret sharing scheme using group presentations
with solvable word problem. Here we use combinatorial distributions of the shares similar to
those introduced in the paper of D. Panagopoulos:
To distribute the shares in a (n, t)-secret sharing scheme the dealer does the following steps:
1. Calculate m =
(
n
t−1
)
, the number of all elements, for example {a1, a2, . . . , am}, the partic-
ipants need to know for the reconstruction of the secret.
2. Let A1, A2, . . . , Am be an enumeration of the subsets of {1, 2, . . . , n} with t− 1 elements.
Define n subsets R1, R2, . . . , Rn of the set {a1, a2, . . . , am} with the property
aj ∈ Ri ⇐⇒ i 6∈ Aj for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m and i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
3. The dealer distributes to each of the n participants one of the sets R1, R2, . . . , Rn.
The new protocols in this paper are based on Nielsen transformations, which are the basis of
a linear technique to study free groups and general infinite groups. We now review some ba-
sic definitions concerning regular Nielsen transformations and Nielsen reduced sets (see [1] or [5]).
Let F be a free group on the free generating set X := {x1, x2, . . .} and let U := {u1, u2, . . .} ⊂ F .
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Definition 1.1. An elementary Nielsen transformation on
U = {u1, u2, . . .} is one of the following transformations
(T1) replace some ui by u
−1
i ;
(T2) replace some ui by uiuj where j 6= i;
(T3) delete some ui where ui = 1.
In all three cases the uk for i 6= k are not changed. A (finite) product of elementary Nielsen
transformations is called a Nielsen transformation. A Nielsen transformation is called regu-
lar if it is a finite product of the transformations (T1) and (T2), otherwise it is called singular.
The set U is called Nielsen-equivalent to the set V , if there is a regular Nielsen transformation
from U to V .
Definition 1.2. Consider elements v1, v2, v3 of the form u
±1
i , call U Nielsen reduced if for all
such triples the following conditions hold:
(N0) v1 6= 1;
(N1) v1v2 6= 1 implies |v1v2| ≥ |v1|, |v2|;
(N2) v1v2 6= 1 and v2v3 6= 1 implies |v1v2v3| > |v1| − |v2|+ |v3|.
Here | · | denotes the free length in F .
Proposition 1.3. If U = {u1, u2, . . . , un} is finite, then U can be carried by a Nielsen trans-
formation into some V such that V is Nielsen reduced.
For a proof see [1, Theorem 2.3] or [5, Proposition 2.2].
For the secret sharing scheme based on Nielsen transformations we will only use regular Nielsen
transformations. We agree on some notations.
We write (T1)i if we replace ui by u
−1
i and we write (T2)ij if we replace ui by uiuj. If we want
to apply t-times one after the other the same Nielsen transformation (T2) we write [(T2)ij ]
t and
hence replace ui by uiu
t
j. In all cases the uk for i 6= k are not changed.
2 A combinatorial secret sharing scheme
Now we present a (n, t)-secret sharing scheme, whereby the secret is the sum of multiplicative
inverses of elements in the natural numbers. For the distribution of the shares the dealer uses
the method of D. Panagopoulos described in Section 1.
The numbers n and t are given, whereby n is the number of participants and t is the threshold.
1. The dealer first calculates the number m =
(
n
t−1
)
.
2. He chooses m elements a1, a2, . . . , am ∈ N. From these elements he constructs analogously
as in Section 1 the sets R1, R2, . . . , Rn. The secret S is the sum
S :=
m∑
i=1
1
ai
∈ Q+.
3. Each participant Pi gets one share Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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If t of the n participants come together they can reconstruct the secret while they first combine
their t private sets Ri and get by construction the set R˜ = {a1, a2, . . . , am}. The secret is the
sum of the inverse elements in the set R˜, that is
S =
m∑
i=1
1
ai
.
If the dealer needs a special secret S˜ ∈ Q he gives every participant one more element x ∈ Q in
each Ri, with
x :=
S˜
S
.
The participants get S˜ by multiplying the reconstructed secret S with x.
Each element aj is exactly contained in n − (t − 1) subsets. Hence for each j = 1, 2, . . . ,m
the element aj is not contained in t − 1 subsets from {R1, R2, . . . , Rn}. As a consequence, aj
is in each union of t subsets. Otherwise, if just t − 1 arbitrary sets from {R1, R2, . . . , Rn} are
combined, there exist a j so that the element aj is not included in the union of this sets.
If just one element aj is absent, the participants do not get the correct sum S, and hence cannot
compute the correct secret.
Example 2.1. We perform the steps for a (4, 3)-secret sharing scheme. It is n = 4 and t = 3.
The dealer follows the steps:
1. He first calculates m =
(
n
t−1
)
=
(4
2
)
= 6.
2. The dealer chooses the numbers a1 := 2, a2 := 1, a3 := 2, a4 := 8,
a5 := 4 and a6 := 2. The secret is
S :=
m∑
i=1
1
ai
=
23
8
.
(a) The six subsets with size 2 of the set {1, 2, 3, 4} are
A1 = {1, 2} , A2= {1, 3} , A3 = {1, 4} ,
A4 = {2, 3} , A5= {2, 4} , A6 = {3, 4} .
With help of the Ai the dealer gets the sets R1, R2, R3 and R4, which contain elements
from {a1, . . . , a6}. He puts the element aj for which i is not contained in the set Aj
for i = 1, . . . , 4 and j = 1, . . . , 6, into the set Ri:
1 6∈ A4, A5, A6 =⇒ R1 = {a4, a5, a6} ,
2 6∈ A2, A3, A6 =⇒ R2 = {a2, a3, a6} ,
3 6∈ A1, A3, A5 =⇒ R3 = {a1, a3, a5} ,
4 6∈ A1, A2, A4 =⇒ R4 = {a1, a2, a4} .
3. The dealer distributes the set Ri to the participant Ti, for i = 1, . . . , 4.
If three of the four participants come together, they can calculate the secret S. For example the
participants T1, T2 and T3 have the set
R˜ :=R1 ∪R2 ∪R3
= {a4, a5, a6} ∪ {a2, a3, a6} ∪ {a1, a3, a5}
= {a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6} ,
3
and hence get the secret
S =
6∑
i=1
1
ai
=
23
8
with ai ∈ R˜.
3 A secret sharing scheme using a regular Nielsen transforma-
tion
In this section we describe a (n, t)-secret sharing scheme which extends and improves the ideas
in Section 2 by using Nielsen transformations. We consider free groups as abstract groups but
also as subgroups of the special linear group of all 2× 2 matrices over Q, that is,
SL(2,Q) =
{(
a b
c d
)
; a, b, c, d ∈ Q and ad− bc = 1
}
.
We use the special linear group over the rational numbers because these numbers can be stored
and computed more efficiently on a computer than irrational numbers.
Let F be a free group in SL(2,Q) of rank m :=
(
n
t−1
)
. The dealer wants to distribute the shares
for the participants as described in Section 1. The shares will be subsets of a free generating set
of the group F .
Steps for the Dealer: The numbers n and t are given, whereby n is the number of participants
and t is the threshold. We have m :=
(
n
t−1
)
.
1. The dealer chooses an abstract free generating set X for the free group F of rank m, that
is
F = 〈X; 〉 with X := {x1, x2, . . . , xm}.
He also needs an explicit free generating set M , that is
F = 〈M ; 〉 with M := {M1,M2, . . . ,Mm}
and Mi ∈ SL(2,Q).
2. With the known matrices in the set M he computes the secret
S :=
m∑
j=1
1
|aj |
∈ Q+ with aj := tr(Mj) ∈ Q,
tr(Mj) is the trace for the matrix Mi :=
(
a b
c d
)
∈ SL(2,Q), that is, tr(Mi) := a+ d. If
the dealer needs a special secret he can act as in Section 2 described.
3. The dealer constructs the shares for the participants in the following way:
(a) He first applies a regular Nielsen transformation simultaneously for both sets X and
M to get Nielsen-equivalent sets U and N to X and M , respectively (see Figure 1).
X := {x1, x2, . . . , xm} M := {M1,M2, . . . ,Mm}
regular Nielsen
transformation
regular Nielsen
transformation
U := {u1, u2, . . . , um} N := {N1, N2, . . . , Nm}
Figure 1: Simultaneously regular Nielsen transformation
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The elements ui are words in X and the elements Ni are words in M . Hence we have
Ni ∈ SL(2,Q).
(b) The dealer now uses the method of D. Panagopoulos to split U and N and to get the
shares (Ri, Sj) for the participants with Ri ⊂ U and Sj ⊂ N .
4. The dealer distributes the shares.
If t of the n participants combine their parts they obtain the sets U and N . The secret can be
recovered as follows:
1. The participants apply regular Nielsen transformations in a Nielsen reduction manner for
U and step by step simultaneously for N . By Proposition 1.3 they get Nielsen reduced
sets X± = {xǫ11 , x
ǫ2
2 , . . . , x
ǫm
m } and M
± = {M δ11 ,M
δ2
2 , . . . ,M
δm
m } with ǫi, δi ∈ {+1,−1}, see
Figure 2.
U := {u1, u2, . . . , um} N := {N1, N2, . . . , Nm}
regular Nielsen
transformations
regular Nielsen
transformations
X± = {xǫ11 , x
ǫ2
2 , . . . , x
ǫm
m } M
± = {M δ11 ,M
δ2
2 , . . . ,M
δm
m }
Figure 2: Simultaneously regular Nielsen transformations
2. With the knowledge of the set M± it is easy to reconstruct the secret
S =
m∑
j=1
1
|aj |
∈ Q+ with tr(Mj) = aj ∈ Q.
Recall that tr(M δii ) = tr(Mi) for i = 1, . . . ,m.
Less than t participants can neither get the whole set U , which is Nielsen-equivalent to X, nor
the set N , which is Nielsen-equivalent to M .
For the calculation of the secret, the participants need the set M , because the secret depends
on the traces of the matrices Mi ∈ M . The participants need both sets U and N . If they just
have one set U or N they cannot get information about the set M .
If the set U is known, it is only known which Nielsen transformation should be done to get the
Nielsen-equivalent set X, but it is unknown on which matrices they should be done simultane-
ously.
If only the set N is known, then the matrices in SL(2,Q) are known, but nobody knows which
Nielsen transformation should be done on N to get the set M . It is also unknown how many
Nielsen transformations were used.
In the book [4] of J. Lehner on page 247 a method is given to explicitly obtain a free generating
set M for a free group F on the abstract generating set X := {x1, x2, . . . , xm}:
Example 3.1. Let F be a free group with countably many free generators x1, x2, . . .. Corre-
sponding to xj define the matrix
Mj =
(
−rj −1 + r
2
j
1 −rj
)
5
with rj ∈ Q such that the following inequalities hold:
rj+1 − rj ≥ 3 and r1 ≥ 2. (1)
The group G generated by {M1,M2, . . .} is isomorphic to F (see [4]).
We now present an example for this secret sharing scheme.
Example 3.2. We perform the steps for a (3, 2)-secret sharing scheme with the help of the
computer program Maple 16. It is n = 3, t = 2 and hence m =
(
3
1
)
= 3.
First the Dealer generates the shares for the participants.
1. The dealer chooses an abstract presentation for the free group F of rank 3
F = 〈X; 〉 with X := {x1, x2, x3}.
He takes an explicit presentation
F = 〈M ; 〉 with M := {M1,M2,M3},
Mi ∈ SL(2,Q) as above. We first mention that the inequalities (1) hold for
r1 =
7
2
, r2 =
15
2
, r3 = 11
and hence the set of the matrices
M1 =
(
−72 −1 +
(
7
2
)2
1 −72
)
=
(
−72
45
4
1 −72
)
,
M2 =
(
−152 −1 +
(
15
2
)2
1 −152
)
=
(
−152
221
4
1 −152
)
,
M3 =
(
−11 −1 + 112
1 −11
)
=
(
−11 120
1 −11
)
is a free generating set for a free group of rank 3.
2. We have
a1 := tr(M1) = −7, a2 := tr(M2) = −15, a3 := tr(M3) = −22,
and hence the secret is
S :=
3∑
j=1
1
|aj |
=
589
2310
.
3. Construction of the shares for the participants:
(a) First the dealer applies regular Nielsen transformations (NTs) simultaneously for both
sets X and M to get Nielsen-equivalent sets U and N to X or M , respectively. These
transformations are shown in the Table 1.
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Table 1: Nielsen transformations (NTs) of the dealer
NTs theoretical set A explicit set M
{x1, x2, x3}
{(
− 7
2
45
4
1 − 7
2
)
,
(
− 15
2
221
4
1 − 15
2
)
,
(
−11 120
1 −11
)}
(T 1)2 {x1, x
−1
2
, x3}
{(
− 7
2
45
4
1 − 7
2
)
,
(
− 15
2
− 221
4
−1 − 15
2
)
,
(
−11 120
1 −11
)}
(T 2)1.2 {x1x
−1
2
, x−1
2
, x3}
{(
15 109
−4 −29
)
,
(
−
15
2
−
221
4
−1 −
15
2
)
,
(
−11 120
1 −11
)}
[(T 2)3.2]
3 {x1x
−1
2
, x−1
2
, x3x
−3
2
}
{(
15 109
−4 −29
)
,
(
−
15
2
−
221
4
−1 −
15
2
)
,
(
−8565 −63664
799 5939
)}
(T 2)2.3 {x1x
−1
2
, x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
, x3x
−3
2
}
{(
15 109
−4 −29
)
,
(
80371
4
597401
4
5145
2
38243
2
)
,
(
−8565 −63664
799 5939
)}
(T 1)1 {x2x
−1
1
, x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
, x3x
−3
2
}
{(
−29 −109
4 15
)
,
(
80371
4
597401
4
5145
2
38243
2
)
,
(
−8565 −63664
799 5939
)}
(T 2)1.2 {x2x
−1
1
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
,
{(
−
3452369
4
−
25661603
4
237917
2
1768447
2
)
,
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
, x3x
−3
2
}
(
80371
4
597401
4
5145
2
38243
2
)
,
(
−8565 −63664
799 5939
)}
(T 1)3 {x2x
−1
1
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
,
{(
−
3452369
4
−
25661603
4
237917
2
1768447
2
)
,
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
, x32x
−1
3
}
(
80371
4
597401
4
5145
2
38243
2
)
,
(
5939 63664
−799 −8565
)}
(T 2)3.2 {x2x
−1
1
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
,
{(
−
3452369
4
−
25661603
4
237917
2
1768447
2
)
,
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
, x32x
−1
3
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
}
(
80371
4
597401
4
5145
2
38243
2
)
,
(
1132425929
4
8417369243
4
−
152350279
4
−
1132425989
4
)}
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The Dealer obtains the sets
U = {u1, u2, u3} := {x2x
−1
1 x
−1
2 x3x
−3
2 , x
−1
2 x3x
−3
2 , x
3
2x
−1
3 x
−1
2 x3x
−3
2 }
and
N = {N1, N2, N3}
:=
{(
−34523694 −
25661603
4
237917
2
1768447
2
)
,
(
80371
4
597401
4
5145
2
38243
2
)
,
(
1132425929
4
8417369243
4
−1523502794 −
1132425989
4
)}
.
(b) He gets the shares (Ri, Sj) for the participants with Ri ⊂ U and Sj ⊂ N as follows:
i. It is m =
(
n
t−1
)
=
(3
1
)
= 3.
ii. The dealer chooses the elements a˜1, a˜2, a˜3 and gets the three sets
A1 = {1} , A2= {2} , A3 = {3} .
With the help of the Ai the dealer gets the sets R
′
1, R
′
2, and R
′
3 which contain
elements from the set {a˜1, a˜2, a˜3}. He puts the element a˜j by which i is not
contained in the set Aj for i = 1, 2, 3 and j = 1, 2, 3, into the set R
′
i.
1 6∈ A2, A3 =⇒ R
′
1 = {a˜2, a˜3} ,
2 6∈ A1, A3 =⇒ R
′
2 = {a˜1, a˜3} ,
3 6∈ A1, A2 =⇒ R
′
3 = {a˜1, a˜2} .
Now we apply this to U and N to create the share-sets for the participants,
respectively:
R1 = {u2, u3} , S1= {N2, N3} ,
R2 = {u1, u3} , S2= {N1, N3} ,
R3 = {u1, u2} , S3= {N1, N2} .
4. The Dealer distributes to each participant a tuple (Ri, Sj). Participant P1 gets (R1, S2),
P2 gets (R2, S3) and P3 gets (R3, S1).
Assume the participants P1 and P2 come together to reconstruct the secret. They generate the
sets U = {u1, u2, u3} and N = {N1, N2, N3}. The secret can be recovered as follows.
The participants apply regular Nielsen transformations step by step simultaneously for both sets
U and N to get X± and M±. The steps are shown in the Tables 2 and 3.
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Table 2: Nielsen transformations (NTs) from the participants I
NTs theoretical set U explicit set N
{x2x
−1
1
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
,
{(
−
3452369
4
−
25661603
4
237917
2
1768447
2
)
,
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
, x3
2
x−1
3
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
}
(
80371
4
597401
4
5145
2
38243
2
)
,
(
1132425929
4
8417369243
4
−
152350279
4
−
1132425989
4
)}
(T 1)2 {x2x
−1
1
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
,
{(
−
3452369
4
−
25661603
4
237917
2
1768447
2
)
,
x3
2
x−1
3
x2, x
3
2
x−1
3
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
}
(
38243
2
−
597401
4
−
5145
2
80371
4
)
,
(
1132425929
4
8417369243
4
−
152350279
4
−
1132425989
4
)}
(T 2)3.2 {x2x
−1
1
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
,
{(
−
3452369
4
−
25661603
4
237917
2
1768447
2
)
,
{x32x
−1
3
x2, x
3
2x
−1
3
}
(
38243
2
−
597401
4
−
5145
2
80371
4
)
,
(
5939 63664
−799 −8565
)}
(T 1)2 {x2x
−1
1
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
,
{(
−
3452369
4
−
25661603
4
237917
2
1768447
2
)
,
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
, x3
2
x−1
3
}
(
80371
4
597401
4
5145
2
38243
2
)
,
(
5939 63664
−799 −8565
)}
(T 2)2.3 {x2x
−1
1
x−1
2
x3x
−3
2
,
{(
−
3452369
4
−
25661603
4
237917
2
1768447
2
)
,
x−1
2
, x3
2
x−1
3
}
(
−
15
2
−
221
4
−1 −
15
2
)
,
(
5939 63664
−799 −8565
)}
(T 2)1.3 {x2x
−1
1
x−1
2
, x−1
2
, x32x
−1
3
}
{(
653
2
9679
4
−45 −
667
2
)
,
(
−
15
2
−
221
4
−1 −
15
2
)
,
(
5939 63664
−799 −8565
)}
(T 1)2 {x2x
−1
1
x−1
2
, x2, x
3
2
x−1
3
}
{(
653
2
9679
4
−45 −
667
2
)
,
(
−
15
2
221
4
1 −
15
2
)
,
(
5939 63664
−799 −8565
)}
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Table 3: Nielsen transformations (NTs) from the participants II
(T 2)1.2 {x2x
−1
1
, x2, x
3
2
x−1
3
}
{(
−29 −109
4 15
)
,
(
−
15
2
221
4
1 −
15
2
)
,
(
5939 63664
−799 −8565
)}
(T 1)1 {x1x
−1
2
, x2, x
3
2
x−1
3
}
{(
15 109
−4 −29
)
,
(
−
15
2
221
4
1 −
15
2
)
,
(
5939 63664
−799 −8565
)}
(T 2)1.2 {x1, x2, x
3
2x
−1
3
}
{(
−
7
2
45
4
1 −
7
2
)
,
(
−
15
2
221
4
1 −
15
2
)
,
(
5939 63664
−799 −8565
)}
(T 1)3 {x1, x2, x3x
−3
2
}
{(
−
7
2
45
4
1 −
7
2
)
,
(
−
15
2
221
4
1 −
15
2
)
,
(
−8565 −63664
799 5939
)}
[(T 2)3.2]
3 {x1, x2, x3}
{(
−
7
2
45
4
1 −
7
2
)
,
(
−
15
2
221
4
1 −
15
2
)
,
(
−11 120
1 −11
)}
With the knowledge of the set M± =
{(
−
7
2
45
4
1 − 7
2
)
,
(
−
15
2
221
4
1 − 15
2
)
,
(
−11 120
1 −11
)}
the participants can
reconstruct the secret easily. It is
a1 := tr(M1) = −7, a2 := tr(M2) = −15, a3 := tr(M3) = −22
and hence it is
S :=
3∑
j=1
1
|aj |
=
1
7
+
1
15
+
1
22
=
589
2310
.
In general we can use any free matrix group F of rank m :=
(
n
t−1
)
for a (n, t)-secret sharing
scheme as it is described in this section. The shares can be generated by the above method and
are tuples (Ri, Sj) with Ri ⊂ U and Sj ⊂ N . Some other ideas for the secret S are
S :=
m∏
i=1
|tr(Mi)| or S :=
m∑
i=1
|tr(Mi)| or
S :=
m∏
i=1
(tr(Mi))
2 or S :=
m∑
i=1
(tr(Mi))
2 or
S :=
m
2∏
i=1
tr([M2i−1,M2i]) if m is even or S :=
m∑
i=1
tr(M2i ).
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4 A variation of the secret sharing scheme based on Nielsen
transformations
We explain a variation of the secret sharing scheme described in Section 3. As in the previous
sections, let F be a free group with the abstract free generating set X := {x1, x2, . . . , xq}, q ∈ N,
that is,
F = 〈X; 〉.
For a (n, t)-secret sharing scheme the dealer chooses a Nielsen reduced set U := {u1, u2, . . . , um} ⊂
F , with m =
(
n
t−1
)
. The ui are given as words in X. The secret is the sum
S :=
m∑
i=1
1
|ui|
,
with |ui| the length of the word ui.
The dealer does a regular Nielsen transformation on the set U to get the Nielsen-equivalent set
V (Figure 3).
U := {u1, u2, . . . , um}
regular Nielsen
transformation
V := {v1, v2, . . . , vm}
Figure 3: Regular Nielsen transformation
Each participant Pi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, gets one set Ri ⊂ V , as above.
If t of the n participants come together to reconstruct the secret, they combine their shares and
get the set V = {v1, v2, . . . , vm}. They have to find a Nielsen-reduced set U
′ := {u′1, u
′
2, . . . , u
′
m}
to V . They apply Nielsen transformations in a Nielsen reducing manner as described in [1] and
[5] and get from V a Nielsen-reduced set U ′. The secret is the sum
S =
m∑
i=1
1
|u′i|
,
because
∑m
i=1 |u
′
i| =
∑m
i=1 |ui| for the Nielsen reduced sets U
′ and U (see [1, Corollary 2.9]).
5 A symmetric key cryptosystem using Nielsen transformations
Before Alice and Bob are able to communicate with each other they have to make some arrange-
ments. Let F be an abstract free group with the free generating set
X = {x1, x2, . . . , xq}, q ∈ N\{1}. Let
ϕ : F → SL(2,Q)
xi 7→Mi,
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be a faithful representation of F into SL(2,Q) as in Section 3. The group G = ϕ(F ) is isomorphic
to F under the map xi 7→Mi, for i = 1, . . . , q.
Let N be the number of letters from the alphabet A = {a1, . . . , aN}, for instance N = 26. We
assume that N ≥ 5.
Let U ⊂ F , U = {u1, . . . , uN} be a basis of a free subgroup of F of rank N . Such systems U are
easily to construct (see [1] or [5]).
There is the one to one assignment
A→ U
aj 7→ uj, for j = 1, . . . , N.
Let U ′ = ϕ(U) = {U ′1, . . . , U
′
N} ⊂ SL(2,Q), uj 7→ U
′
j for j = 1, . . . , N . The set U
′ is a basis
for a free subgroup of G. Now, Alice and Bob agree on a block sequence P := p1p2 · · · pk with,
say, 1 ≤ pi ≤ 4 and k ≥ 2, and for each pi they construct a regular Nielsen transformation fi
from U ′ to a Nielsen-equivalent system fi(U
′) = {V ′i1 , . . . , V
′
iN
}, fi(U
′
j) = V
′
ij
, j = 1, . . . , N . The
Nielsen transformations fi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, should be pairwise different and given as sequences of
elementary Nielsen transformations from U ′ to fi(U
′).
As soon as Alice an Bob agree on a Nielsen transformation fi they compute fi(U
′), i = 1, 2, . . . , k,
independent from each other even if they do not know the message. Hence they get a one to one
assignment between the letters in their alphabet A and the matrices for the ciphertext depending
from the part of the sequence P . This is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Assignment: Letters in A = {a1, a2, . . . , aN} to matrices for the ciphertext depending
from the part of the Sequence P
Elements from the alphabet A
a1 a2 . . . aN
Sequence P
p1 V
′
11 V
′
12 . . . V
′
1N
p2 V
′
21
V ′22 . . . V
′
2N
...
...
... . . .
...
pk V
′
k1
V ′k2 . . . V
′
kN
Now, Alice wants to send a message S with z, z > 0, letters from A. To describe the procedure
let first
z = |S| =
k∑
i=1
pi.
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Alice cuts the message S into pieces corresponding to the sequence P , that is,
S = a11 · · · a1p1a21 · · · a2p2 · · · ak1 · · · akpk ,
with aij ∈ A for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ pi. Then she uses the Table 4 to get the matrices for
the ciphertext depending on the sequence pi, 1 ≤ i ≤ k:
If aij = at then aij 7→ V
′
it , 1 ≤ t ≤ N, 1 ≤ j ≤ pi.
The ciphertext C is the following sequence of matrices:
C = V11 · · · V1p1V21 · · ·V2p2 · · ·Vk1 · · · Vkpk ,
with Vgq ∈ {V
′
g1
, V ′g2 , . . . , V
′
gN
} for 1 ≤ g ≤ k and 1 ≤ q ≤ pg. Alice sends the ciphertext C just
as a sequence of matrices to Bob. To reconstruct the message S Bob does the following steps:
1. He cuts back the ciphertext into pieces as above corresponding to the known sequence P .
2. Because he gets the same table as Alice (Table 4) he can match V ′ij to at for the piece
corresponding to pi, with 1 ≤ i ≤ k, 1 ≤ j ≤ pi and 1 ≤ t ≤ N , and hence reads the
message S in the alphabet easily.
Now, assume that z = |S| 6=
∑k
i=1 pi.
If z <
∑k
i=1 pi, there is no problem, Alice just ends with the last letter.
If S = S˜1S˜2 with |S˜1| =
∑k
i=1 pi then she first applies the above procedure to S˜1 and continues
then with S˜2 in the same manner.
Indeed, if z = |S| >
∑k
i=1 pi and S = S˜1S˜2 · · · S˜m with |S˜1| = · · · = |S˜m| then we may improve
the cryptosystem. Alice and Bob agree in addition on a permutation σ ∈ Sm, Sm the symmetric
group on m symbols, and work with S˜σ(1)S˜σ(2) · · · S˜σ(m) instead of S = S˜1S˜2 · · · S˜m. Bob starts
then the decryption procedure with applying first σ−1.
Remark 5.1. 1. If Alice wants to send several messages to Bob or vice versa, then to improve
the system, they may replace during each message transmission the Nielsen transformations
fi by different Nielsen transformations, for instance by f˜i = fif
k for a fixed Nielsen
transformation f on U and k = 0, 1, 2, . . .. They also may replace the system U ⊂ F by
different systems, such that U is not used too often.
2. The cryptosystem is a polyalphabetic system. A matrix u ∈ U , and hence a letter a ∈ A,
can be encrypted differently at different times.
3. A possible attacker Eve cannot read the message. She can only see a sequence of matrices
in SL(2,Q). From this she neither knows the system U ′ = ϕ(U) nor the Nielsen trans-
formations fi. Since the block lengths pi are very small (it is 1 ≤ pi ≤ 4 for all i) and
since rather frequently the Nielsen transformations fi and the system U will be changed, a
statistical frequency attack is almost impossible.
Moreover, if we just have two N -tuples {A1, . . . , AN} and {B1, . . . , BN} in SL(2,Q), it is
hard to decide if they generate the same group, in fact, if A ∈ SL(2,Q) and H a subgroup
of SL(2,Q), it is hard to decide if A ∈ H.
More details and generalizations of the cryptosystem as well as more cryptographical analysis
can be found in [6] by A. Moldenhauer.
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6 Cryptosystem with Nielsen transformation inspired by the
ElGamal cryptosystem
Now we describe a public key cryptosystem for Alice and Bob which is inspired by the ElGamal
cryptosystem (see [3] or [7, Section 1.3]), based on discrete logarithms, that is:
1. Alice and Bob agree on a finite cyclic group G and a generating element g ∈ G.
2. Alice picks a random natural number a and publishes the element c := ga.
3. Bob, who wants to send a message m ∈ G to Alice, picks a random natural number b and
sends the two elements m · cb and gb, to Alice. Note that cb = gab.
4. Alice recovers m =
(
m · cb
)
·
((
gb
)a)−1
.
In the following cryptosystem let N ∈ N be the number of letters from the used alphabet,
X = {x1, x2 . . . , xN}, S = X ∪ X
−1 and F the free group on the free generating set X, that
is, F = 〈X; 〉. The message is an element m ∈ S∗, the set of all words on S. Public are the
free group F , its generating set X, an element a ∈ S∗ and an automorphism f : F → F , of
infinite order, given as a Nielsen transformation or a Whitehead automorphism (see [2]). Each
automorphism of F is a product of elementary Nielsen transformations between two bases of F
(see [1, Korollar 2.10]).
The cryptosystem is now as follows:
Public parameters: The group F = 〈X; 〉, an element a ∈ F and an automorphism f : F → F
of infinite order.
1. Alice chooses a n ∈ N and publishes the element c := fn(a) ∈ S∗.
2. Bob picks a random t ∈ N and his message m ∈ S∗. He calculates c1 := m · f
t(c) ∈ S∗ and
c2 := f
t(a) ∈ S∗. He sends the ciphertext (c1, c2) ∈ S
∗ × S∗ to Alice.
3. Alice calculates
c1 · f
n(c2)
−1 = m · f t(c) · fn(c2)
−1
= m · f t(fn(a)) · (fn(f t(a))−1
= m · f t+n(a) · (fn+t(a))−1
= m,
and gets the message m.
Remark 6.1. A possible attacker, Eve, can see the elements c, c2, c1 ∈ S
∗. She does not know the
free length of m and the cancellations between m and f t(c) in c1. Hence she gets no information
about m from the element c1. Eve just sees words in the free generating system from which it is
almost impossible to realize the exponents n and t, that is, the private keys from Alice and Bob,
respectively.
Remark 6.2. We give some ideas to enhance the security, they can also be combined:
1. The element a ∈ F is a common secret between Alice and Bob. They could use for example
the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld key exchange protocol (see [7]) to agree on the element a.
2. Alice and Bob agree on a faithful representation from F into the special linear group of all
2 × 2 matrices with entries in Q, that is, g : F → SL(2,Q). Now m ∈ S and Bob sends
c1 := g(m) · g(f
t(c)) ∈ SL(2,Q) instead of c1 := m · f
t(c) ∈ S∗. Therefore Alice calculates
c1 · (g(f
n(c2)))
−1 = g(m) and hence the message m = g−1(g(m)) ∈ S.
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